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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in accordance with 
§ 78~2-2-(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1991)1 because this is 
an appeal from a final order of the District Court for the First 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for the County of 
Cache and jurisdiction has not been placed in the Court of Appeals 
under § 78-2a-3 U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether a freely bargained for contractual provision 
which determines where venue shall lie for causes of action arising 
out of that contract is enforceable? 
2. Whether a parties' stipulation, that all litigation 
arising out their mutual contract shall be brought in a court of 
competent jurisdiction where the defendant resides, requires 
dismissal of an action brought otherwise than in accordance with 
its terms? 
3. Whether a forum selection clause providing that venue for 
any litigation arising out of the Agreement, or in connection with 
the transaction shall lie in a particular court is mandatory? 
'Unless otherwise stated, all further references to Utah Code 
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1991) shall be referred to as U.C.A. 
4. Whether the attempted unilateral termination of an 
Agreement containing a valid forum selection clause by the party 
seeking to avoid enforcement of the Agreement's forum selection 
clause prevents enforcement of the forum selection clause? 
All issues involve questions of law, therefore the District 
Court's rulings should be reviewed for their correctness. Mountain 
Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Ut. 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following Utah State Statutes and section of the Utah 
Constitution are applicable to the case at bar: 
§ 78-13-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial 
in the following cases: 
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is 
not the proper county. 
(2) when there is reason to believe that an 
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or 
precinct designated in the complaint. 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends 
of justice would be promoted by the change. 
(4) when all the parties to an action, by 
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the 
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be changed to 
another county. Thereupon the court must order the 
change as agreed upon. 
§ 78-13-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
When the defendant has contracted in writing to 
perform an obligation in a particular county of the state 
and resides in another county, an action on such contract 
obligation may be commenced and tried in the county where 
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such obligation is to be performed or in which the 
defendant resides. 
§ 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1991), as amended: 
When the defendant has signed a contract in the 
state to perform an obligation, an action on the contract 
may be commenced and tried in the following venues: 
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in real 
property securing a consumer's obligation, the action may 
be brought only in the county where the real property is 
located or where the defendant resides. 
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than 
under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where 
such obligation is to be performed, the contract was 
signed, or in which the defendant resides. 
§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the 
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the 
county in which any defendant resides at the commencement 
of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a 
corporation, any county in which such corporation has its 
principal office or place of business shall be deemed the 
county in which such corporation resides within the 
meaning of this section. If none of the defendants 
resides in this state, such action may be commenced and 
tried in any county which the plaintiff may designate in 
his complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart 
from the state, such action may be tried in any county 
where any of the parties resides or service is had, 
subject, however, to the power of the court to change the 
place of trial as provided by law. 
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, prior to 1985 
repeal: 
The state shall be divided into seven judicial 
districts, for each of which, at least one judge shall be 
selected as hereinbefore provided. Until otherwise 
provided by law, a district court at the county seat of 
each county shall be held at least four times a year. 
All civil and criminal business arising in any county, 
must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be 
taJc^ n, in such cases as may be provided by law. Each 
judge of a district court shall be at least twenty-five 
years of age, an active member of the bar in good 
standing, learned in the law, a resident of the state of 
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Utah three years next preceding his selection, and shall 
reside in the district for which he shall be selected. 
Any district judge may hold a district court in any 
county at the request of the judge of the district, and, 
upon a request of the governor it shall be his duty to do 
so. Any cause in the district court may be tried by a 
judge pro tempore, who must be a member of the bar, sworn 
to try the cause, and agreed upon by the parties, or 
their attorneys of record. (As amended November 7, 1944, 
effective January 1, 1945.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The present appeal concerns the enforcement of a contractual 
stipulation specifying the forum for litigation arising out of the 
contracting parties' relationship. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiff originally filed its complaint for breach of 
contract in the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Utah ("District Court"). The defendant then brought 
a Motion to Dismiss, based upon a clause in the contract which 
required that all actions be brought in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state where the defendant resides. The 
District Court determined that enforcement of the forum selection 
clause contained in the contract was not prohibited by any 
applicable Utah law and that the contractual stipulation should be 
enforced according to its express terms. Accordingly, the District 
Court dismissed the case. The plaintiff has appealed the District 
Court's dismissal of the case to this court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lundahl Instruments, Inc. ("Lundahl"), Plaintiff and 
Appellant (a Utah corporation), and Safety Technology, Inc. 
("STI"), Defendant and Appellee (a California corporation), 
voluntarily, knowingly, at arm's length and under the 
representation of counsel executed a Master License and Marketing 
Agreement dated April 21, 1989 ("Agreement"). (Record at 53.) 
2. STI's principal place of business and residence is 
California. (Record at 1, 23). 
3. The Agreement contains a clause which says, in pertinent 
part: 
Venue for any litigation arising out of this 
Agreement, or in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby, shall lie in any federal or state 
court sitting in Defendant's state, with proper 
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Therefor, 
if Lundahl were to commence an action against STI, 
jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were to file 
an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in Utah. 
(Record at 54.) 
4. In February of 1991, Lundahl unilaterally attempted to 
terminate the Agreement, over the written objections of STI. 
(Record at 40). 
5. STI does not recognize Lundahl's improper termination of 
the Agreement and intends to assert numerous defenses and 
counterclaims based upon Lundahl's wrongful actions. (Record at 
40-41) . 
6. Lundahl filed the instant action on June 6, 1991; and the 
District Court dismissed the action on September 30, 1991, based 
5 
upon § 78-13-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. (Record at 1, 
53-55). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah law provides that its venue provisions may be waived by 
parties to an action. Further, Utah law allows parties to 
stipulate where venue for certain types of action will lie. 
In the present case, each party to the contract knowingly 
waived its right to assert venue according to the statutes of the 
state where it maintains its respective residence. The parties 
stipulated that venue for any litigation arising out of their 
Agreement, or in any way connected with the Agreement, should lie 
in any federal or state court sitting in the defendant's state, 
provided the court has proper jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Because Utah law allows venue to be waived, and by statute 
expressly provides that parties may stipulate where venue shall 
lie, the parties should be bound by the terms of their contract, 
which contract was freely bargained for and entered into with the 
able representation of counsel, and for which no allegations of 
fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, undue bargaining power or 
adhesion have been raised. 
The unambiguous wording of the forum selection clause and use 
of the word "shall" are mandatory rather than permissive. It 
should be enforced accordingly. 
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Further, the equities of the case being evenly balanced, 
plaintiff should be required to bear the hardship of traveling to 
a foreign forum because it agreed to at the time of contracting. 
Finally, because no fraud in connection with the forum 
selection clause as been alleged, and because this action arises 
out of the Agreement or in connection with the transactions 
contemplated therein, a wrongful, unilateral attempt to terminate 
the Agreement, even if successful, does not affect the validity and 
enforceability of the forum selection clause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IS VALID, ENFORCEABLE, AND 
AUTHORIZED BY UTAH STATUTES AND CASE LAW. 
A. Forum Selection Clauses Are Prima Facie Valid And 
Enforceable Under The Majority Rule. 
Even though forum selection clauses in the past were not well 
received, "the vast majority of courts today follow the rule that 
such clauses are prima facie valid and will be upheld absent a 
showing that they result from fraud, overreaching, that they are 
unreasonable or unfair, or that enforcement would contravene a 
strong public policy of the forum." Intermountain Systems, Inc. v. 
Edsall Const. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D. Colo. 1983); 
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute. 499 U.S. , 113 L. Ed. 622 
(1991). The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971) 
follows this same approach and it has been adopted by many state 
courts. See, Manrique /. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. n986); 
ABC Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Harvev, 701 P.2d 137, 139 (Colo. App. 
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1985); Colonial Leasing Co, v. Mcllrov, 765 P.2d 219, 220 (Or. 
App. 1988) . 
Prior hostility of courts to forum selection clauses was due 
to an argument that such clauses tended to "oust" a court of 
jurisdiction. This was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in 
The Bremen v> Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1971). In 
Bremen, the Court rejected such arguments as "hardly more than a 
vestigial legal fiction." Id. Regarding the ouster of 
jurisdiction argument, the Court stated: 
"It appears to rest at core on historical judicial 
resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and 
business of a particular court and has little place 
in an era when all courts are overloaded and when 
businesses once essentially local now operate in 
world markets. It reflects something of a 
provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other 
tribunals." 
Id. The threshold question which should be applied today is 
whether a court should exercise "its jurisdiction to do more than 
give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, 
manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically 
enforcing the forum clause." Id. 
Courts have given various reasons supporting the enforcement 
of forum selection clauses: (1) Such clauses are demanded by 
present-day commercial realities and expanding trade. Id. at 15. 
(2) Failure to enforce such clauses will provide "procedural 
loopholes through which one of the contracting parties can use 
dilatory tactics to escape clearly entered into obligations." 
Maritime LTD. Partnership v. Greenman AD. A. , 455 So. 2d 1121, 1123 
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1984). (3) They promote uniform results 
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because a corporate defendant will not have to litigate similar 
issues in numerous different forums. LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson, 
585 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Mass. 1984). (4) They protect the 
legitimate expectation of the parties; Steward Organization, Inc. 
v. RICOH Corp. . 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Concurring opinion by 
Justice Kennedy) . (5) They limit the fora in which a large 
corporate defendant could be potentially subject to suit. Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute. 113 L. Ed. at 632. (6) They dispel 
confusion "about where suits arising from the contract must be 
brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of 
pretrial motions to determine the correct forum, and conserving 
judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding 
those motions." Id. (7) Finally, they reduce litigation costs, 
which savings may be passed on to consumers. Id. 
Utah courts have not expressly adopted the Restatement or 
federal case law, nor have they addressed whether forum selection 
clauses are even valid and enforceable. Utah case law and Utah 
statutes are, however, in harmony with the above principles. 
B. Forum Selection Clauses Do Not Contravene Any Strong 
Public Policies of the State of Utah. 
Sections 78-13-9(3) and 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. state: 
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the 
following cases: 
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of 
justice would be promoted by the change. 
(4) when all parties to an action, by stipulation or by 
consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree that 
the place of trial may be changed to another county. 
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed upon. 
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Montana has almost identical statutory provisions except for 
one very significant difference. The Montana statutes state: 
Section 25-2-201 Montana Code Ann- (1991), When change of 
venue is required. The court or judge must, on motion, change 
the place of trial in the following cases: . . . (3) when the 
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be 
promoted by the change. 
Section 25-2-202 Montana Code Ann. (1991) , Change of venue on 
agreement of parties. All the parties to an action, by 
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the 
minutes, may agree that the place of trial may be changed to 
any county in the state. Thereupon the court must order the 
change as agreed upon. (Emphasis added) 
The Montana supreme court has held that these statutes 
authorize forum selection clauses in contracts. Montana Wholesale 
Accounts Service. 758 P.2d 759, 760 (Mont. 1988). 
Section 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. does not restrict changes in venue 
to counties within the state, as does Montana's statute. If the 
Utah legislature had intended that changes in venue be limited to 
changes within the state it would have drafted the statute as did 
the Montana legislature. The fact that the words "in the state" 
are missing in the Utah statute indicates the legislature did not 
intend a similar restriction. Even if the omission was merely an 
oversight on the part of the legislature, the broad authority 
contained in § 78-13-9(3) U.C.A. indicates that such contractual 
provisions are not against any strong public policy enunciated by 
the legislature. 
A legislature knows how to draft a statute to clearly state 
their intent. In Title 29, General Provisions Relating to 
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Contracts, Idaho Code Ann. (1991 Supp.) § 29-110, Limitations on 
right to sue, it states: 
Every stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any 
party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under 
the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary 
tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus 
enforce his rights, is void. 
Id. 
The Utah statutes are devoid of any remotely similar 
provision. Therefore, enforcement of a forum selection clause in 
Utah would not contravene any strong public policy. 
Regardless of which venue statute is controlling, the results 
are identical. Section 78-13-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953), § 78-13-4 
U.C.A., and § 78-13-7 U.C.A. all allow venue for the present case 
to lie in the county where the defendant resides and are modified 
and controlled by the additional options of § 78-13-9 U.C.A. A 
complete reading of § 78-13-7 U.C.A. reveals that, contrary to 
plaintiff's contention, there is nothing requiring the current 
action to be brought exclusively in the First Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah or even requiring it to be in Utah as it 
states the action may be "in the county in which any defendant 
resides" or "[i]f none of the defendants resides in this state, 
such action may be commenced and tried in any county which the 
plaintiff may designate in this complaint." Id. , (emphasis added). 
The use of the word "may" makes this provision purely permissive. 
Defendant does not dispute that absent the contractual 
stipulation f\\e current action could be brought in the First 
Judicial District; however, by its express terms § 78-13-7 U.C.A. 
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does not mandate that the current action be maintained only in the 
First Judicial District. Moreover, § 78-13-7 U.C.A. is still 
"subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as 
provided by law" and thus any mandatory directives of § 78-13-7 
U.C.A. are subject to the overriding provisions of § 78-13-9 U.C.A. 
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, which was repealed 
in 1985, is irrelevant to the current action because in White v. 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.. 71 P. 593, 594 (Ut. 1903) the 
court stated that this section is "so indefinite and general as to 
render it necessary in each case in which the venue is made an 
issue to resort to the common law in order to determine whether the 
venue has been properly laid." Id. Current statutes have made a 
resort to the common law unnecessary to determine where venue 
should properly lie. 
Finally, § 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. does not state that only 
stipulations entered into by the parties to the action subsequent 
to filing a court action are enforceable by the court. This 
section states that when parties to an action, either by 
stipulation or by consent in open court agree that the place of 
trial may be changed to another county, "[t]he court must order the 
change as agreed upon." (emphasis added). The Montana supreme 
court, as previously quoted, has interpreted this to include 
contractual agreements entered into by the parties prior to any 
litigation. Montana Wholesale Accounts. 758 P.2d at 760. Notably, 
§ 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. is not permissive; it requires courts to order 
changes according to the parties' agreement. 
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C. Forum Selection Clauses Should Be Enforced Because They 
Represent Parties' Rights To Freely Contract As Desired, 
Absent Any Violation Of Public Policy Considerations, 
Utah courts have long recognized that "[w]ith few exceptions, 
it is axiomatic in contract law that persons dealing at arm's 
length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving one side or 
the other from the effects of a bad bargain." Bekins Bar V Ranch 
v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Ut. 1983); see also John Call 
Engineering v. Manti City Corp. , 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Ut. 1987) ("a 
party is bound by the contract which he or she voluntarily and 
knowingly signs,"); Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926, 
928 (Ut. 1980) ("it is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible 
for obligations he assumes by contract."). 
Under the above enunciated principles, Utah recognizes that 
parties should be bound by the contracts which are freely entered 
into and they should not be allowed to escape responsibility for 
terms which they agreed to, just because the deal may have turned 
sour. Although Utah courts have not applied these contract 
principles to cases dealing with forum selection clauses, federal 
courts have and they have required parties to abide by the terms of 
their agreements. In Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci American, Inc. , 
858 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1988) the plaintiff, an exclusive 
dealer of Italian perfume, brought an action against the perfume's 
manufacturer for breach of contract and various torts. The Italian 
defendant sought to enforce a forum selection clause that required 
actions to be brought in Italian courts. In rejecting the concern 
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propounded by the plaintiff the court stated, "it is a concern 
which the parties presumably thought about and resolved when they 
included the forum selection clause in their contract. [The 
plaintiff] now wants to change the bargain." Id. 
Similarly, in Rini Wine Co. v. Guild Wineries and 
Distilleries. 604 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1985) the court found 
that the inconveniences asserted by the party seeking to avoid the 
forum selection clause were not grounds sufficient to prevent 
transfer of the case. Much like the Manetti-Farrow court, the 
court in Rini Wine Co. stated that because the plaintiff could have 
foreseen the inconveniences at the time of entering into the 
agreement, it could not now complain of any injustice. Id. at 
1059. 
D. Forum Section Clauses Should Be Valid And Enforceable 
Because Contracting Parties Have Waived Their Rights To 
Venue As Dictated by Statute. 
Finally, under Utah law "venue is a privilege which may be 
waived." Petersen v. Oaden Union Railway and Depot Co., 175 P.2d 
744, 747 (Ut. 1946). "Provisions in a contract selecting a forum 
act as a waiver of statutory provisions which would normally 
determine the appropriate forum." Furry v. First Nat. Monetary 
Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 8 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
A forum selection clause acts as a waiver of venue rights and 
the right to assert lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. 
International Investment and Equine Consultants. Inc., 573 F. Supp. 
592, 594 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Refining 
and Marketing. Inc.
 f 764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. App. 1988). Because 
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parties to a contract may "agree in advance to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the 
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether," it follows 
that parties may also agree concerning where venue shall lie. The 
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11. 
Lundahl voluntarily waived its rights to the venue provisions 
in Utah's statutes when it agreed that: 
Venue for any litigation arising out of this Agreement, or in 
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby, shall 
lie in any federal or state court sitting in Defendant's 
state, with proper jurisdiction over the subject-matter 
thereof. Therefore, if Lundahl were to commence an action 
against STI, jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were 
to file an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in 
Utah. 
Lundahl foresaw the inconveniences that might arise from such a 
provision; however, while represented by counsel, it freely chose 
to enter into the Agreement. There have been no allegations of 
fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, unreasonableness or 
unfairness. Regardless of whether the case is litigated in 
California or Utah, one party will suffer an inconvenience. Each 
party was equally bound by the Agreement's terms. Had STI brought 
the action it would have been required to endure the inconveniences 
of litigating in a foreign forum. 
The action is for breach of contract and subject-matter 
jurisdiction is proper within a California court. There have been 
no allegations that California does not have an interest in 
guarantying a party's rights under a contract. Hence Lundahl would 
not be deprived of its day in court, nor will it work an injustice 
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to require Lundahl to litigate its claims in a California's court. 
Accordingly, the plain terms of the Agreement should be enforced. 
II. THE CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION IS MANDATORY, UNLESS WAIVED. 
"'Shall' in other contexts has an ordinary meaning of 
imperative obligation, leaving no discretion or choice for the 
actor. It is typically contrasted and distinguished from 'may.'" 
Intermountain Systems Inc., 575 F. Supp. at 1198. The judge in 
Intermountain further stated, "I know of no reason why a different 
result should obtain in a forum selection clause." Id.; see e.g., 
S. Lewis Lionberaer Co. v. Edward G. Gerritts. 687 F. Supp. 237, 
238 (W.D. Va. 1987) (clause which simply submitted any and all 
disputes to a particular forum was found to be mandatory.)2; see 
also, ABC Mobile Systems, 701 P.2d at 139 (forum selection clause 
merely stating "the venue of actions . . . are placed"3 found to 
be mandatory.) 
The contractual stipulation in question contains much stronger 
language than the provisions referenced above. It is not merely 
permissive because it states venue "shall" lie in the defendant's 
resident state. Moreover, to clarify, the stipulation gives an 
illustration of how venue shall be determined. In view of the 
2In its entirety the clause stated: Subcontractor hereby 
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the federal courts of the 
Southern District of Florida for the resolution of any and all 
disputes involving an aggregate amount of $10,000.00 or more and 
agrees that service by registered mail to its address set forth 
above shall constitute sufficient service. Id. 
3The entire clause stated: The place of a?I payments required 
under this agreement and the venue of actions for disputed matters 
and performances are placed in the City of Oakland, county of 
Alameda, State of California. Id. 
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strong language and clear illustration, the contractual stipulation 
cannot be characterized as permissive only. 
Because the defendant has not waived its right to assert the 
contractual provision, the plaintiff is bound to its agreement. 
III. THE EQUITIES ARE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
THE DEFENDANTS RESIDENCE AS VENUE CHOICES. 
"The burden should be upon the party who brings suit elsewhere 
than in the selected state to persuade the court that enforcement 
of the choice of forum clause would be unjust." Colonial Leasing 
Co. v. Mcllroy. 765 P.2d at 220. In Colonial the court found that 
"the jurisdictional provision was not a 'take-it-or-leave-it' 
proposition. . . . The Defendant chose to take it, and plaintiff 
did not compel that choice." Id. Accordingly, the court ruled 
that enforcement of the clause was not unfair or unreasonable. 
When the equities are equally balanced, the forum selection 
clause should be enforced. Cedarbrook Associates v. Equitec 
Savings Bank. 678 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Cedarbrook 
the plaintiffs' documents and witnesses were located in 
Pennsylvania while the defendant's documents and an important 
witness were located in California. The forum selection clause 
specified venue should lie in California. The court held the trial 
should be in California because "as between the two forums, one 
side is bound to be inconvenienced." Id. 
In Rini Wine Co. . the court stated: "it should be incumbent on 
the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the 
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient 
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that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in 
court." 604 F. Supp. at 1059. The court further noted that 
"litigation to one degree or another subjects all parties, whether 
corporations or individual, to hardship. The essential inquiry is 
whether plaintiff could foresee these inconveniences at the time of 
entering into the agreement." Id. Having so noted, the Rini Wine 
Co. court held that because the inconveniences were foreseeable the 
plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof. Id. ; see, also, LFC 
Lessors, Inc.. 585 F. Supp. at 1364-1395 (Where businessman was not 
coerced into signing the agreement and enforcement of the clause 
would not effectively deprive him of his day in court, agreement 
would be enforced); Karlbera European Tanspa Inc., v. JK-Josef 
Dratz Vertriebsaesellschaft MBH. 615 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. 111. 1986) 
(American distributor required to litigate in West Germany because 
inconveniences not insurmountable and therefore plaintiff was not 
deprived of his day in court). 
The instant case is not simply a failure by the defendant to 
pay for goods received pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code 
Article Two Sales Contract case. Defendant intends to assert 
numerous affirmative defenses and counterclaims in its response. 
(Record at 40, 41). Although plaintiff may be inconvenienced by 
litigating in the state of California, defendant will be equally 
inconvenienced if it is forced to litigate in the state of Utah. 
The parties have already agreed and stipulated who should bare the 
burden of these inconveriences. Plaintiff should not be allowed to 
escape the terms of the bargained for Agreement. 
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IV, THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT GOVERNS THE CURRENT ACTION, EVEN IF IT 
WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED BY THE WRONGFUL 
UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF, 
11
 In the absence of contractual language expressly or 
implicitly indicating the contrary, a forum selection clause 
survives termination of the contract. Termination of a contract 
does not divest parties of rights and duties already accrued," 
Advent Electronics, Inc. v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., 709 F. 
Supp. 843, 846 (N.D. 111. 1989). Further, if resolution of given 
claims relates to the interpretation of a contract containing a 
forum selection clause, the forum selection clause will govern, 
even though the claims may sound in tort. Id. Finally, even if 
the contract is invalid because of fraud, "the fraud complained of 
must be specifically related to the inclusion of the forum 
selection clause" in order to invalidate it. Zions First National 
Bank v. Allen. 688 F. Supp. 1495, 1498 (D. Ut. 1988). 
In February of 1991, the plaintiff, unilaterally and in 
violation of the express terms of the contract, attempted to 
terminate the contract. (Record at 40) . Defendant has never 
recognized plaintiff's improper termination and intends to assert 
numerous defenses and counterclaims based upon plaintiff's wrongful 
actions. However, even if the court finds that the Agreement was 
validly terminated, under the above stated principles, the forum 
selection clause should still be enforced because the action arose 
out of the Agreement or was in connection with the transactions 
contemplated thereir. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the final order of the 
district court should be affirmed. 
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